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Abstract
This paper examines how a wide array of factors (household and individual level
financial, health and other taste shifter characteristics) influence retirement plans over
time and how uncertainty affects the strategies that individuals use to plan their
retirement years.  Using panel data models we examine the role of health and economic
factors on retirement planning using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  We
examine the rationality of plans for retirement controlling for sample selection.  After
controlling for sample selection, reporting biases, and unobserved heterogeneity we find
that plans for retirement do follow the random walk hypothesis and pass tests of weak
and strong rationality.  These findings allow us to assume rationality and examine
retirement plans using first differences. We then examine changes to those factors and the
effects of new information on plans and find that new information contributes little to
changes in plans.  This leads us to conclude that on average people correctly form
expectations over uncertain events when planning for retirement. These results have
important implications for a wide variety of models in economics that assume rational
behavior.
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The purpose of this paper is to study the evolution of retirement plans using the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  We are interested in how these plans are influenced
by individual and household factors such as wealth, pensions and Social Security, health
and other taste shifters.  We are also interested in how new information changes plans
over time.  And finally, we seek to understand how expectations are formed and how
relevant information is used in that formation to test for the rationality of expectations.
Most of the retirement literature focuses on the retirement “outcome”.  Dynamic
retirement models use backward induction to evaluate how the decision was made with
an emphasis on the role of health and economic status of agents in the household.  We
take a different approach and explore how people’s retirement plans evolve over time.
We can examine the influence of Social Security policy and other financial incentives as
well as health along the way.  Understanding how factors affect expectations would give
us a better understanding of the importance of these incentives.
Much of the work on expectations of retirement focuses on accuracy by testing
them against outcomes (Bernheim 1988, 1989; Dwyer and Hu 1999; Dwyer 2002).
Deviations are explained by unanticipated changes to relevant factors.  That analysis
focuses on how accurate expectations are in terms of their relationship to the outcome.  It
does not focus on how expectations are formed. Bernheim (1990) is one of the few papers
that analyses how expectations form and evolve, which is also, in part, the purpose of our
research. We want to understand which factors matter when planning for retirement, how
is existing information used, and how does new information fit in.  In particular, how
anticipated are shocks to relevant factors and how should uncertainty be modeled?  Panel
data available through the HRS allow us to observe people’s plans as they approach2
retirement.  We take advantage of the richness of the data, not only in evaluating factors
that influence retirement plans over time, but also in analyzing how rational those plans
are and how new information influence those plans. We can test theoretical models of
rational behavior, allowing for uncertainty.  Rational behavior is defined here as decision-
making that is based on a model (possibly dynamic) with both economic and health
constraints.
There is heterogeneity in how people plan for retirement.  Some who have
thought little of retirement reveal unconstrained preferences, while others follow the
constrained model using full information.   Prior work does not account for these
different types of planners, except for the selection into the sample of planners.  In this
work we control for unobserved heterogeneity exploiting the longitudinal nature of the
HRS.
We discuss the literature and our contribution in Section 1, followed by the
conceptual model and econometric specifications in Section 2.  Section 3 provides
information about the data used in the analysis.  Section 4 reports our main findings.  We
conclude in Section 5.  The models and simulations for the dynamic programming part of
the project are in the appendix.
1.  Background
Comparing Expectations to Outcomes
Bernheim in his seminal work (1988, 1989) explores the connection between
expectations and outcomes and finds that people do not use all the information available
to them, but otherwise they form rational plans and stick to them.  The main finding is3
that people report likely outcomes instead of mean dates given a probability distribution.
He uses the Retirement History Survey (RHS), which represents a cohort retiring in the
seventies.  The data were not as rich in their ability to study retirement expectations,
particularly in health status.
More recent work by Dwyer and Hu (1999) and Dwyer (2002) also examine this
question in a static life cycle framework comparing baseline plans to outcomes.  Dwyer
and Hu (1999), using only the first two waves of the HRS, find that people who retire
early as planned tend to be able to afford to do so (are more likely to have sources other
than Social Security benefits to pay for additional leisure).  The punchline of that
preliminary work is that health was a more important predictor of retirement plans, while
economic factors became more influential in determining actual retirement.  Dwyer
(2002) compares baseline expectations (ages 51-61) of retirement to outcomes by wave 4
(ages 57-67) when a substantial sub-sample has reached its expected retirement age.  She
finds that a majority of the HRS sample follows through on plans for retirement if you
include partial retirement in the definition. However, health and socio-economic factors
still play a role in explaining changes to plans, even after conditioning on the plans.  This
may have some policy implications, particularly policies involving changes to eligibility
ages for retirement and other reform proposals.
That literature throws away all of the information available between the initial
baseline plan and the ultimate outcome at the final stage. We care about the adjustment
process in between.  We also worry about heterogeneity in how much people thought
about retirement.  In the first round of interviews, not everyone has thought about4
retirement, and we only observe plans for those who have.
1  So there is a sample selection
problem that is exacerbated by focusing in on only those who thought about it early on in
the process.  In this work we control for this sample selection, and we utilize full
information in the five waves and examine how expectations are formed and how new
information changes expectations over time.
Forni (2002) uses the first two waves of the HRS to examine how financial shocks
influence deviations to plans.  He uses self- reported financial shocks that are noisy and
do not perform well in the models.  He concludes that the data are consistent with
Bernheim’s finding that reported expectations measure likely retirement outcomes rather
than the mean of the expected retirement age distribution.
Recent work by Coronado and Perozek (2001) examine the effect of unanticipated
changes in wealth on retirement and find that households were more likely to retire early
if they held more corporate equity immediately prior to the 1990s (bull market).  They
introduce uncertainty to financial factors and examine the retirement outcome.  We
examine a similar question regarding uncertain factors influencing retirement but we
focus on retirement expectations over time.  Lusardi (1999) focuses on the importance of
information costs in the retirement decision and savings, which acknowledges uncertainty
in a different way from the present project.
Expectations Formation
Not too much work has studied expectation formation.  Bernheim (1990) focuses
on expectations formation to test individuals’ rationality.  He cannot reject the hypothesis
                                                
1 Some people report expected ages of retirement even though they admit to not having thought about it
much.  A majority of those who have not thought about it do not report any expected age.  Many say they
will likely 'never' retire if they do report something.  Prior work uses any age with no adjustment for the5
of strong rationality, meaning that only new information affects individual changes of
expectations regarding S.S. receiving ages.  We build on Bernheim’s model of
expectations formation.  We use his tests of rationality with some modifications and
updates.  First, we use the full longitudinal HRS instead of the two waves of the old RHS.
We measure retirement expectations differently, and with different instruments to deal
with endogeneity and reporting biases problems. We also use panel data techniques and
control for sample selection.
Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) study expectation formation using only wave 1 of the
HRS.  The contribution of that work is to incorporate health into models of labor supply.
So they deal with the potential endogeneity of health.  They use expectations of
retirement (the same measure we use) as a proxy for retirement.  The assumption is that
the expectation is equal to the outcome.  This work builds on that model of expectations
formation, uses longitudinal data, and tests their hypothesis.
Dynamic Models
The prior research we have discussed so far, uses static life cycle models of the
retirement decision and apply it to planning for retirement to test rationality.
Specifically, that work examines changes to relevant factors as well as baseline
expectations on realizations of retirement in a static framework, which answers a slightly
different question (Dwyer, 2002, Dwyer and Hu, 1999, Bernheim, 1989). Or they
examine expectation formation in the static life cycle framework (Dwyer and Mitchell,
1999).  One of our objectives is to revisit some of those assumptions, but we are also
interested in pursuing this question in a dynamic framework. We are interested in testing
                                                                                                                                                
amount of planning that went into it.  That work also uses proxies of benefit take-up for expected age if it is
missing.6
for rationality to understand how to appropriately incorporate uncertainty in dynamic
models.  The rational expectations assumption is a cornerstone of most dynamic utility
maximization models under uncertainty. How realistic is this assumption when the
uncertain outcome is health status?  We are currently developing a model that introduces
uncertainty over a variety of factors.
The recent literature on dynamic modeling has been able to solve rich dynamic
life cycle models of retirement.  We will apply these retirement models to study
expectation formation, using the information provided in the HRS, and allowing for
uncertainty over health shocks.  Dynamic models to date have not focused on expectation
formation with respect to the variables considered stochastic.  Models to date usually
assume the variables follow a certain distribution, which is then integrated out using
numerical or mathematical methods.  We propose to take a closer look at how
expectations over uncertain outcomes are formed, and how they influence current
decisions.  If we are unaware of how these expectations are formed, and whether they are
realized, we might be missing an important dimension of the decision making process by
rational agents, potentially leading to less efficient policy recommendations.  In this
work, we test rationality before assuming it in the next stage of this research.
For example, Rust, Buchinsky, and Benítez-Silva (2001) model the U.S.
Disability programs along with the more traditional Social Security system, to gain
insight into the whole range of incentives that individuals face as they approach
retirement.  However, little is discussed about how agents form expectations regarding
the probability of becoming disabled, or losing their current job, or how likely it is that
they will have access to social insurance programs when they reach retirement.  These7
expectations can potentially have a big impact in their current decisions regarding
consumption, asset allocation, labor supply and even types of health insurance programs
they want to be covered by.
We develop a model that builds on Bernheim’s (1990) model of expectation
formation to derive our econometric specification as well as Benítez-Silva (2000), Rust
and Phelan (1997), and Rust, Buchinsky and Benitez-Silva (2001) to derive our dynamic
model.  Our contributions are twofold:  First, we extend Bernheim’s model to analyze
retirement expectation formation.  We utilize full panel data to test our model and we go
further in several directions.  We have 5 waves of data and can control for unobserved
heterogeneity, various forms of selection bias, and also attrition bias.  The results have
important implications for the growing literature on dynamic modeling.  Second, we are
developing a dynamic model of expectation formation that assumes rational behavior.
We introduce uncertainty over lifetime, interest rate, wages, and health status, and then
simulate the state and control variables over time, among them the health transitions. We
are working on estimating a model that focuses on uncertainty over health and wealth
outcomes.
2.  A Model of Expectations
Following Bernheim's model of expectation formation we define:
, t
e
t x E X Ω =                   (1)
where we write the expectation about the value of the variable X, call it retirement age
(Social Security benefits in Bernheim 1990).  The information set at time t is represented
by Ω t, and E is the expectations operator.8
Variables included in the vector of regressors, Ω , come from standard life cycle
models of retirement behavior (see Lumsdaine and Mitchell 1999 for a survey).  It is well
established that the factors that influence retirement include household health and socio-
economic status.  We begin our analysis by examining the role of these factors on
retirement expectations.  Our hypothesis is that the factors that influence retirement also
influence retirement expectations in a similar way.
Using the law of iterated expectations and equation (1) we get:
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where ω t+1 represents information that comes available between periods t and t+1.  This
expression presents the evolution of expectation through time and implies that




t X X η    (3)
where E(η t+1|Ω t)=0.  In fact η t+1 should be a function of new information received since
period t, ω t+1.  Bernheim tests the framework with the following regression:




i t X X , , , 1 ε γ β α + Ω + + = +       (4)
where the theory implies that α =γ =0 and β =1.
2 A weak test of rationality assumes that
γ =0 and tests for α =0 and β =1 - in other words tests to see if expectations follow a
random walk.  A strong test of rationality is less restrictive and also tests for γ =0.
Bernheim (1990) cannot reject these hypotheses once he controls for measurement error
                                                
2 Bernheim (1989), Dwyer and Hu (1999) and Dwyer (2002) use a similar model and test using outcomes
against expectations.9
in the self-reports using instrumental variables.
3 We will retest them using the full
longitudinal HRS and we also control for measurement error and sample selection.
4
As in Bernheim, we are interested in rationality, as well as the role of new
information in expectation formation.  How do shocks affect expectations?  Are shocks to
some degree anticipated?  Re-arranging equation (3) and allowing for errors we get:




i t X X , , 1 , 1 ε γη µ + + + = + +  or




i t X X , , 1 , 1 ε γη µ + + = − + +    (5)
This assumes β =1.  We can examine the role of changes to specific factors (in Ω ) on
changes to expectations. We test whether γ =0. In other words, does new information
affect retirement expectations or was that new information anticipated, on average, and
included in last period's expectations?
Econometric Concerns
First, we need to appropriately control for observed heterogeneity, which is not
trivial when we consider omitted variable as well as potential reporting biases.  How to
incorporate relevant factors that are imperfectly observed has it's own set of issues.   In
addition, respondents make decisions on many factors that may not be observable to the
analyst.  Given these measurement error and omitted variable bias issues, unobserved
heterogeneity becomes a concern.   We want to take into account the unobserved
heterogeneity potentially present in our characterization of the econometric model.  If we
                                                
3 He instruments with other expectations that may be equally plagued with measurement error.  He does not
test the instruments as we do.  We will discuss our instruments in the results section.10
do not control for the unobserved components we will be confounding partial and total
effects of our variables of interest.  Panel data sets allow us to model explicitly how those
unobserved components enter the econometric specification, and we can choose to
include them as a fixed effect or as a random variable, and test the different
specifications.
5
Related to this is sample selection.  Not only do people differ in their far-sightedness,
but in their ability to process information. For this reason we need to control for sample
selection as well.  It is not very difficult to control for sample selection in cross-sections,
but it becomes a more complex problem in panel data models with attrition, and the
unbalanced nature of the panels becoming an issue.   This presents interesting
methodological challenges.
Sample selection can be depicted in the following schematic model of retirement
expectations that controls for clustering (see Deaton, 1997):
i t i t
e
ti X 1 , 1 , 1 ε γ α + Ω + =   (6)
and
i i i Y 2 2 2 2 ε γ α + Ω + =   (7)
where the set of individual characteristics, Ω 1i consists of various socio-economic and
demographic variables, and other variables we will describe below, and 
e
ti X  represents
the expected retirement age at time t.  Yi is an indicator of whether or not any thought has
been given to the retirement plans and determines whether or not we observe 
e
ti X , and ε 1i
                                                                                                                                                
4 Rosen (1990) in his commentary on Bernheim's work acknowledges the potential for selection bias in
responses to survey questions about expectations.
5 For an interesting discussion of these econometric concerns see Wooldridge (2002), Hsiao (1986), Nijman
and Verbeek (1992), Verbeek and Nijman (1992), Vella and Verbeek (1999), Kyriazidou (1997) and
Kyriazidou (1999).11
and  ε 2i are not independent.  This means that the selection rule is potentially not
independent of the behavioral function being estimated.  It is fairly straightforward to
estimate the full model by Maximum Likelihood or by standard two-step procedures.
The HRS provides us with repeated observations of the same individuals.  This allows
us to control for potential unobserved components that could enter our econometric
model.  Our main equation of interest can now be written as:
ti i ti ti u c X + + Ω = α   (8)
where  ci represents the unobserved heterogeneity component, and uti are the
idiosyncratic disturbances.  We can estimate this model assuming either no correlation
between observed explanatory variables and the unobserved effect (random effects), or
allowing for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effect and the observed
explanatory variables (fixed effects).  We can then test whether the random effects
specification or the fixed effect specification is more appropriate, and whether the former
is more appropriate than the pooled OLS regression.
The more complex issues arise when we have to take into account selection and
attrition bias in this panel model as well.  We combine the above models to include the
unobserved component as well as the sample selection correction.
Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models with Sample Selection
The three models we test make different assumptions about how unobserved
heterogeneity enters the model. OLS models assume ci=0, fixed effects assume no
distribution on ci and that it is fixed and non-random across individuals, and the random
effects models assume random assignment of ci based on some distribution.12
Identification of these models becomes trickier when we incorporate sample selection,
another form of unobserved heterogeneity into the picture.
3. Data
We follow respondents through all five waves of the HRS.  The HRS is a nationally
representative longitudinal survey of 7,700 households headed by an individual aged 51
to 61 as of the first round of interviews in 1992-93.  The primary purpose of the HRS is
to study the labor force transitions between work and retirement with particular emphasis
on sources of retirement income and health care needs.  It is a survey conducted by the
Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan and funded by the National
Institute on Aging.  The data for the respondents are merged from wave 5 backwards to
waves 4,3,2, and 1, and we construct a set of consistent variables on different sources of
income, financial and non-financial wealth, health, and socio-economic characteristics
that will be assigned to each decision maker appropriately.
We include any observation for respondents that are working, full time or part time,
in any wave.  We exclude respondents who do not report retirement plans for more than
two consecutive years and for whom we observe relevant information, which results in
4,980 respondents in the sample and 12, 854 observations in the analysis of pooled data.
We construct relevant dependent and independent variables for each wave.  We also
construct a transitions dataset that consists of changes to these variables across waves,
since for part of the analysis we are interested in changes of variables over time.13
In each wave working respondents are asked when they plan to fully or partially
depart from the labor force.
6 They were also asked if they thought about retirement much.
These questions are not mutually exclusive, but most of the people who have not thought
about retirement do not report an expected age.
7 Many people report they will never
retire.  These same people often change their minds at some point and report an age.  The
analysis is sensitive to how we treat "never retire" since we need to put in some older age
that we select arbitrarily.  We report results for two alternatives.  First, we assign an age
of 85 for those who never retire. We call this the full model.  Next, we omit them from
the analysis, but correct for the selection into this group.
8  The way we measure expected
retirement age deviations is by taking the difference between the current wave and the
prior one in the reported expected age of retirement.
9
As indicators of economic status, we constructed variables of net worth and
household wealth.  We also control for income for the respondent and the spouse.  We are
working on retirement income variables and better controls for health insurance for the
household.  At this time we control for whether or not respondents have private health
insurance.
We use health limitations, self-ratings, as well as a number of disease indicators and
activities of daily living to control for health status.  We also control for the self-reported
probability of living to age 85 as a measure of the individual's time horizon.  This
                                                
6 In wave 1 they only were asked about a full departure.
7 Many of them report that they will never retire.  If they have not given it any thought, and they say they
will never retire, we consider them as missing information.  If they give a retirement age we treat them as
non-missing.
8 Using age 85 creates a large variance in the mean of this estimate, which affects the constant in the
regressions.
9 We do not need to worry about censoring in this way because we just examine changes to plans over time.
If there are missing values for one wave we use the prior wave of information but we are only willing to go14
variable may be correlated with health and own discount rates.  Hurd and McGarry
(1995) find this variable to be highly correlated with own health status and parent
mortality.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the pooled sample.  It is broken up into four
tables.  The first two tables report levels and transition by sample type (full versus
restricted).  The next two tables report levels and transitions by selection criteria.  For the
transition data each observation represents transitions between two of the five waves so
that each individual has up to four observations.  73% of our sample has information for
all four transition periods and 84% have it for three.
Beginning with Table 1a, we see that removing those who report that they will never
retire reduces the average expected retirement age from 64.3 to 61.5.  This is to be
expected since those who were removed receive are assigned a value of 85.  Other than
this definitional difference, there are no statistically significant differences between the
two samples.  Earnings of those who plan to work forever are only slightly higher but this
is not statistically significant.   With the exception of stroke and high blood pressure, the
group that plans to never retire is slightly healthier and expects to live longer.   Looking
at the transitions of this data in Table 1b, we see that there are much bigger transitions in
expected retirement ages if we include the people who report they will never retire.  The
frequency of change is only slightly higher for the full sample, but the magnitude of the
change is much larger. This is because of the arbitrarily high age that we needed to use
for the "nevers". These plans do change 58.3% of the time so there is a sufficient amount
of variation to study.  On average people are postponing retirement since the average
                                                                                                                                                
back one wave.  In other words, if the expected retirement age is missing for two consecutive waves then
we treat the observation as missing.15
deviation in expected retirement age is positive.  There are bigger changes in earnings
and private health insurance status among those who never plan to retire.
There is nothing surprising in the factors that influence retirement.  Roughly 24% of
the sample report work limitations.  Most of them report themselves in good to fair
health.  The most common physical condition reported is arthritis.
Tables 1c and 1d compare by the selection criteria; whether or not you thought about
retirement.  Roughly 42% of the sample gave retirement some thought.  Those who have
not thought about retirement are less likely to be employed during the panel, and are
significantly worse off financially.  They report more health limitations and worse overall
general health.  They visit the doctor more but have fewer heart problems, lower blood
pressure, and less arthritis and diabetes than those who have thought about retirement.
Those who have not thought about retirement are slightly older and more likely to be
female.  They are also less educated and more likely to have higher earner spouses.
4. Results from Econometric Models
Analysis of Expectations Formation
The first part of the analysis examines factors that influence how people form
retirement expectations.  As previously mentioned, this is the first paper to study this
question using panel data and focusing on the expectation formation with controls for
unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection.  Table 2a,i reports pooled OLS, and
fixed and random effects results with no sample selection controls for the full sample.
Using the Hausman specification test we can reject the fixed effects model over the
random effects (we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same).  Using a16
Lagrange Multiplier (Breusch-Pagan) test we find that the random effects model
specification is preferred to the pooled OLS.  We find that people with higher net worth
plan to retire earlier probably because they can afford to.  People who can afford private
health insurance are also more likely to plan an earlier retirement.  Higher earners are
postponing retirement.
People who report themselves in poor health plan to retire later.  People who plan to
live longer also plan to work longer.  The other health factors are not significant and
robust.  Heart problems are significant but once we control for unobserved heterogeneity
that effect goes away.  Married people plan to retire earlier.
Controlling for sample selection changes the results considerably and the selection
bias is significant.  This is not surprising given the differences in all factors by whether or
not people have given thought to retirement.  We see in table 2a.ii.,  that after controlling
for sample selection the magnitude of the effect of earnings is slightly larger and the
opposite sign.  So people who earn more are more likely to plan to work longer (higher
opportunity cost, substitution effect).  A report of work limitations significantly reduces
the expected retire date by a year.  The effect of overall poor health goes away.  This was
positive when we did not account for how much thought went into the plan.  After
controlling for sample selection, the subjective mortality probability remains significant
but a little smaller in magnitude.  People with heart problems plan later retirements,
maybe because they have learned to adjust to their condition with respect to when it was
diagnosed.  Or perhaps harder workers are more likely to have heart problems.  The
effect of marriage remains the same.  People with a higher propensity to have thought
about retirement, retire later.17
Tables 2b reports the same models for the restricted sample.  Removing those who
never thought about retirement reduces some of the estimated magnitudes (health
limitations in particular).   The notable differences are in general health, heart problems
and martial status.  People in average to below average general health are planning to
retire later.  People with heart problems report plans that are 2 years earlier on average
than those without heart problems.  For the full sample this was smaller in magnitude
(1.2) and positive.  People who plan to never retire are more likely to have heart
problems.  So they were assigned an age of 85 which was driving that positive sign in the
full model.  Married people still plan to retire earlier, but the magnitude of the effect is
smaller by a year.
The punchline from this part of the analysis is that health, time horizon, and socio-
economic factors play a role in plans for retirement, even after controlling for unobserved
differences and sample selection.  Sample selection is significant.  We also learn that the
respondents who report they will never retire are significantly different and this needs to
be controlled for.
Tests of Rationality
Table 3a reports the weak and strong tests of rationality for the full sample and
Table 3b reports the same for the restricted sample.  In the full sample the data support
the weak and strong rationality hypotheses only in a model that corrects for sample
selection and measurement error in the report of expected retirement age.
10  W e  g e t
coefficients for beta of 0.94 and 0.80 for the weak and strong tests respectively.  For the
restricted sample we cannot reject the hypothesis of rationality when we control for
                                                
10 We perform an F-test based on the null hypothesis that β =1 to test for rationality.18
measurement error.  The sample selection correction results in a rejection of the random
walk hypothesis but not the strong rationality assumption in that restricted sample.
The strong test includes information available at time t that should not be
significant after controlling for time t expectations.  Significance would imply that this
factor was not incorporated in the previous periods expectations and implies
underutilized information.  After controlling for sample selection and measurement error
we find that most of these factors are no longer significant.  So once we get closer to a
model of rationality, this information becomes redundant.  This is less true for the full
model than for the restricted.  So in the full model people with cancer are significantly
more likely to plan to retire earlier.  Cancer may be a disease that is less predictable than
others.  Also for the full model, poor general health makes a difference.  This could be
correlated with other disease related shocks.
11  Similarly, people with unanticipated
health shocks are less likely to report that they will never retire, and then are out of the
restricted sample.  So these effects go away when we remove those individuals from the
sample.
The objective behind instrumental variables estimation here is to correct for
potential measurement error in the reported expected age of retirement at time t.  Since
people are reporting expectations over uncertain events, we expect some degree of
reporting error that may be correlated with unobserved factors thus the error term.  In
fact, Bernheim (1988) finds that expectations are reported noisily.  Like Bernheim
(1990), we correct for this problem using instrumental variables analysis.  The
instruments must be correlated with the expected retirement age but not with the error19
term or any new information relevant to the t+1 expectation.  We use time t subjective
survival to age 85 probabilities and an indicator of smoking behavior as instruments for
expected retirement age.  The strongest specification remains the corrected IV on the full
sample.  The instruments pass the test of overidentifying restrictions.
The punchline from this part of the analysis is that people, on average, seem to
plan rationally for retirement.  However, we may want to pay some attention to health
shocks that may not be anticipated in formation of expectations.
The Role of New Information
In this analysis we are interested in the role of new information, or shocks since
the prior period, on expected retirement age.  We examine the effects of changes to all of
the relevant factors on plan deviations.  We hypothesize that there will be no effects if on
average people are able to anticipate shocks.  Table 4a reports results with and without
sample selection corrections for the full model.  Analogous results are reported for the
restricted sample in Table 4b.
The findings are very interesting.  The only factors that consistently significantly
alter retirement plans are changes to reports of subjective survival probabilities (to age
85) and new cancer diagnoses.  These results are robust across all specifications, with the
exception of the fixed effects model with no sample selection where cancer is not
statistically significant.  People who have a new cancer since the last wave (last two
years) and survive, are delaying their plans to retire by about 2 years.  People who
increase their likelihood of a longer time horizon also postpone retirement by 1.6 years.
                                                                                                                                                
11 Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) find that this rating is a good indicator of underlying diseases rather than a
measure of functional status and ability to perform work.  So an unexpected diagnosis of disease is more20
Changes to economic status have no effect, nor do any of the other health and
demographic indicators.  We may conclude that cancer is a disease that is not often
predicted and anticipated.  The probability of living to age 85 will be adjusted based on
own health and family health.  So researchers need to pay careful attention to
incorporating the uncertainty of health shocks in dynamic models.
These same variables, cancer and the time horizon indicator, are never significant
in the model that excludes people who report they will never retire.  But health continues
to be the only significant shock affecting retirement plans.  Results are fairly robust
across specifications.  It is not functional status changes that alter plans, but new diseases
and illnesses.  Variables like diabetes transitions, stroke, and having high blood pressure
are significant.  The self-rating is significant in all but the uncorrected fixed effects
model.  This variable represents an index of disease and illness (Dwyer and Mitchell,
1999).
The punchline of this analysis is that on average, people incorporate uncertainty
over economic factors and ability to perform work in their retirement expectations.  But
on average they do not do as well with uncertainty over disease, illness, and longevity.
5. Conclusions and Future Research
There are three main areas that this research makes its contributions.  First, we
examine factors that influence expectation formation using panel econometric techniques
to control for potential sample selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity.  We learn
that unobserved heterogeneity significantly explains some of the variation in expectation
                                                                                                                                                
likely to be unanticipated and this is not too surprising.21
formation and that people who have thought about retirement are selectively different in
factors that influence retirement.  The findings are consistent with prior work on
retirement behavior as well as cross sectional work on expectation formation.  Health and
socio-economic factors are all factors that influence the formation of expectations, with
health explaining more of the variation.
Second, we test for rationality in the formation of expectations.  Rational behavior is
defined as following a model of retirement that uses information about household health
and socio-economic status in formation of expectations.  We perform weak and strong
tests of rationality and cannot reject it after controlling for reporting error and sample
selection.  The tests are based on the hypothesis that average expected retirement ages are
not changing over time, or on average people are forming expectations accurately.  This
has important implications for dynamic work that is often identified under the assumption
of rational expectations.
Finally we examine the role of new information, or shocks, to changes in retirement
plans.  We further test the rational expectations hypothesis, this time focusing on how
well people anticipate shocks over factors relevant to the retirement decision.  If we can
incorporate uncertainty in a way that shocks can be modeled as following a distribution
that is known, or in other words, if on average shocks are anticipated, the dynamic model
is more clearly identified.  So now we test the use of new information in the formation of
expectations.  We find that components of health that are associated with disease and
longevity are not predicted well and warrant extra attention in the dynamic framework if
we seek to better fit the data.22
The results in this analysis are preliminary. Future work will incorporate health
insurance in a way that is exogenous to the model as well as better information about
retirement income.   Prior work finds that health insurance availability is one of the most
important predictors of retirement and expected retirement.  We will also investigate
potential attrition bias.
The econometric work motivates a more structural approach to examining transitions
to health and their effects on plans.  We have a preliminary dynamic model (see
appendix) and we include some simulations that are very preliminary as well.  We plan to
estimate the model incorporating our health transitions model as well as introducing
uncertainty to other factors.  This is all part of a broader research agenda where we plan
to simulate Social Security reform proposals (in the form of changes to benefits) as well
as examine the implications for savings behavior with new information over time.
Future work will also examine joint expectation formation, and joint retirement
decisions.
12
                                                
12 We have done most of the analysis in this paper on married couples, assuming that the spouse's
information is exogenous to the individual utility maximization problem.  We do find that spouse's
information is significant, in a model of expectations formation, and therefore we need to expand the model
to allow for joint expectation formation. However, changes to spouse’s variables seem to be well
anticipated.23
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Retirement Plans and Outcomes
   Expected Retirement Age
   Employee
   Self employed
Economic Factors
   Net Worth
   Housing wealth
   Respondent Earnings
Health Insurance
   Tied to work
   Retiree
   Government
   Private
Health Factors
   Health Limitations
   Self-Rating
   Doctor visit times
   Probability of living to age 85
   Diabetes
   Arthritis
   Difficulty walking one mile
   Difficulty climbing stairs
   Stroke
   Heart Problems
   Cancer
   High blood pressure
Demographic
   Age
   Male
   Married
   Bachelor’s Degree
   Professional Degree
   Spouse Health (where relevant)
   Spouse income
































































Retirement Plans and Outcomes
  Changes in Expected Retirement Age
  Frequency of change
Economic Factors
  Changes in Net Worth
  Changes in Respondent Earnings
Health Insurance
  Changes in Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
   Health limitation transitions
13
   Self Rating G, F, P transitions
14
   Stroke transitions
15
   Heart Problems transitions
3
   Cancer transitions
3
   Diabetes transitions
   High blood pressure transitions
3
   Arthritis transitions
   Smoking transitions
    Probability of living to age 85
   Doctor's visits
   Climbing stairs
   Walking a mile
Demographic





  2.900 (69.409)




  -0.031 (0.223)
  -0.010 (0.186)
  -0.032 (0.287)
  -0.172 (0.562)
  -0.137 (0.592)
  -0.022 (0.234)








  2.648 (71.794)




   -0.030 (0.219)
   -0.009 (0.186)
   -0.032 (0.288)
   -0.174 (0.564)
   -0.137 (0.592)
   -0.024 (0.232)





                                                
13 =1 if new limitation, 0 if no change, and -1 if you got better
14 positive means health worsened (=1 if excellent, =5 if poor)
15  positive means condition (Stroke, cancer, hbp) worsened (0 no change, -1 if better)
16 =1 means new marriage, = 0 no change, =-1 dissolved marriage (widow, divorce…)28






Retirement Plans and Outcomes
   Expected Retirement Age
   Employee
   Self employed
Economic Factors
   Net Worth
   Housing wealth
   Respondent Earnings
Health Insurance
   Tied to work
   Retiree
   Government
   Private
Health Factors
   Health Limitations
   Self-Rating
   Doctor visit times
   Probability of living to age 85
   Diabetes
   Arthritis
   Difficulty walking one mile
   Difficulty climbing stairs
   Stroke
   Heart Problems
   Cancer
   High blood pressure
Demographic
   Age
   Male
   Married
   Bachelor’s Degree
   Professional Degree
   Spouse Health (where relevant)

































































Retirement Plans and Outcomes
  Changes in Expected Retirement Age
  Frequency of change
Economic Factors
  Changes in Net Worth
  Changes in Respondent Earnings
Health Insurance
  Changes in Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
   Health limitation transitions
17
   Self Rating G, F, P transitions
18
   Stroke transitions
19
   Heart Problems transitions
3
   Cancer transitions
3
   Diabetes transitions
   High blood pressure transitions
3
   Arthritis transitions
   Smoking transitions
    Probability of living to age 85
   Doctor's visits
   Climbing stairs
   Walking a mile
Demographic






   -0.035 (0.433)
0.016 (0.410)
0.120 (0.867)
   -0.001 (0.075)
   -0.038 (0.241)
   -0.012 (0.197)
   -0.040 (0.292)
   -0.212 (0.561)
   -0.179 (0.594)
   -0.020 (0.234)







  -0.077 (4.420)





  -0.018 (0.182)
  -0.008 (0.163)
  -0.016 (0.275)
  -0.098 (0.559)
  -0.056 (0.581)
  -0.029 (0.233)





                                                
17 =1 if new limitation, 0 if no change, and -1 if you got better
18 positive means health worsened (=1 if excellent, =5 if poor)
19  positive means condition (Stroke, cancer, hbp) worsened (0 no change, -1 if better)
20 =1 means new marriage, = 0 no change, =-1 dissolved marriage (widow, divorce…)30
Table 2a .  Factors Influencing How People Form Expectations - Levels Analysis
Full Sample,
i.  No Selection Correction
coefficient (standard error)
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Economic Factors
  Net Worth
  Respondent Earnings
  Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
   Health limitation
   Self Rating G, F, P
   Doctor visit times
   Probability of living to age 85
   High blood pressure
   Diabetes
     Cancer
     Stroke
   Heart Problems
   Arthritis problem
   Difficulty walking













  -0.003 (0.001)**
   1.008 (0.297)**
-0.393 (0.290)
     0.263 (0.129)**
    -0.029 (0.027)
    2.392 (0.384)**
    -0.128 (0.257)
0.679 (0.470)
0.706 (0.727)
    -1.682 (3.210)
   1.208 (0.560)**
    -0.128 (0.242)
     0.437 (0.468)
0.819 (0.613)
   -1.557 (0.307)**
0.016










   -1.682 (3.210)
0.016 (0.788)
   -0.284 (0.324)








  0.729 (0.264)**
   -0.281 (0.283)
   0.286 (0.120)**
   -0.016 (0.015)
   2.260 (0.351)**





   -0.255 (0.227)
0.273 (0.439)
0.785 (0.528)





Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (OLS vs. RE):  chi2(1)=349.4, p>chi2 = 0
Hausman Test Statistic (RE vs. FE):  chi2(16) = 223.3, p>ch2=0.1131
Table 2a .  Factors Influencing How People Form Expectations - Levels Analysis
Full Sample,
ii.  Selection Correction
coefficient (standard error)
Variables Pooled OLS Random Effects
Economic Factors
  Net Worth
  Respondent Earnings
  Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
   Health limitation
   Self Rating G, F, P
   Doctor visit times
   Probability of living to age 85
   High blood pressure
   Diabetes
    Cancer
    Stroke
   Heart Problems
   Arthritis problem
   Difficulty walking










Fraction due to unobserved
0.005 (0.019)
    0.003 (0.002)**
    0.838 (0.272)**
  -0.904 (0.305)**
      -0.009 (0.125)
1.916 (0.362)





      -0.422 (0.259)
      -0.584 (0.478)
0.211 (0.575)
      -1.405 (0.277)**
    5.173 (0.475)**
0.010 (0.019)
    0.003 (0.001)**
    0.628 (0.264)**
  -1.011 (0.294)**
0.002 (0.113)
       -0.045 (0.016)**





    1.167 (0.506)**
       -0.054 (0.227)
       -0.390 (0.444)
0.196 (0.530)
       -1.581 (0.296)**
    4.712 (0.494)**
0.0268
0.5332
Table 2b.  Factors Influencing How People Form Expectations - Levels Analysis
Restricted Sample  - Excludes Nevers for people who have not thought about it
i.  NO selection correction
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Economic Factors
  Net Worth
  Respondent Earnings
  Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
  Health limitation
  Self Rating G, F, P
  Doctor visit times
  Probability of living to age 85
  High blood pressure
  Diabetes
    Cancer
    Stroke
  Heart Problems
  Arthritis problem
  Difficulty walking









Fraction of variance due to
unobserved component
Corr(ci, ε i)
   -0.022 (0.009)**
      0.001 (0.0003)**
  0.260 (0.153)*
    -0.204 (0.153)
   0.174 (0.064)**
    -0.005 (0.010)
   0.414 (0.201)**
0.109 (0.130)
   0.438 (0.222)**
0.335 (0.326)
    -1.460 (1.014)
0.228 (0.234)
    -0.072 (0.124)
 0.383 (0.224)*
    -0.176 (0.277)




   -0.095 (0.181)
   -0.091 (0.204)
   0.365 (0.097)**
0.008 (0.012)
 0.552 (0.290)*
   -0.024 (0.149)
0.427 (0.289)
0.170 (0.424)
   -1.649 (1.360)








  -0.009 (0.010)
0.001 (0.001)
0.151 (0.126)
  -0.155 (0.134)
   0.222 (0.057)**
0.001 (0.007)





  -0.087 (0.242)
  -0.045 (0.105)
0.196 (0.211)
  -0.078 (0.257)





Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (OLS vs. RE):  chi2(1)=601.9, p>chi2 = 0
Hausman Test Statistic (RE vs. FE):  chi2(16) = 17.1, p>ch2=0.3833
Table 2b.  Factors Influencing How People Form Expectations - Levels Analysis
Restricted Sample  - Excludes Nevers for people who have not thought about it
ii.  Selection correction
Variables Pooled OLS Random Effects
Economic Factors
  Net Worth
  Respondent Earnings
  Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
  Health limitation
  Self Rating G, F, P
  Doctor visit times
  Probability of living to age 85
  High blood pressure
  Diabetes
    Cancer
    Stroke
  Heart Problems
  Arthritis problem
  Difficulty walking
  Difficulty climbing stairs
Demographic
  Age
  Age Sq.
  Male
  Bachelor’s Degree
  Professional Degree
  Married
  Lambda
  Adj. R-Square
Fraction due to unobserved
  -0.033 (0.010)**
   0.005 (0.001)**
0.135 (0.137)
  -0.458 (0.155)**
0.015 (0.064)




  -2.300 (1.078)**
 0.517 (0.293)*
-0.259 (0.133)*
      -0.236 (0.246)
-0.563 (0.301)*
 -0.419 (0.146)**
  3.349 (0.243)**
-0.018 (0.010)*
   0.003 (0.001)**
0.104 (0.125)
  -0.388 (0.138)**
   0.116 (0.059)**





       -1.916 (0.923)**
       -0.028 (0.241)
0.054 (0.105)
       -0.018 (0.212)
       -0.310 (0.258)
  -0.619 (0.151)**
    1.735 (0.230)**
0.017
0.6634
Table 3a.  The Strong Test of Rationality - Expected Retirement Age Conditional on last
period's - Full Sample
Variables Pooled OLS IV Corrected IV
Weak Test (H0: exp t =1):
Constant
Expected Retirement Age time  t
Test of Overid Restrictions
Strong Test (H0: exp t =1):
Constant
Expected Retirement Age time t
Economic Factors time t
   Net Worth
   Respondent Earnings
   Private Health Insurance
Health Factors time t
   Health limitation
   Self Rating G, F, P
   Doctor visit times
   High blood pressure
   Diabetes problems
   Cancer
   Stroke
   Heart Problems
   Arthritis problems
   Difficulty walking
    Difficulty climbing stairs
Demographic time t
   Age
   Age squared
   Male
   Ba
   Profd
   Married
   Education
Adjusted R_squared
Lambda





   59.887 (11.876)**
   0.371 (0.023)**
0.034 (0.022)





     -0.138 (0.291)
     -0.729 (0.478)
 -1.826 (0.786)**
 -1.660 (0.642)**




  -1.066 (0.419)**
   0.013 (0.004)**
   0.947 (0.244)**
0.059 (0.318)











  -0.0003 (0.0016)
0.289 (0.341)
0.168 (0.340)
    -0.232 (0.140)*
0.023 (0.021)
    -0.059 (0.302)
-0.689 (0.552)
   -2.053 (0.862)**
    -1.144 (2.870)
    -0.274 (0.644)
0.467 (0.291)
    -0.028 (0.561)
0.678 (0.695)
  -1.003 (0.436)**
   0.012 (0.005)**
   0.970 (0.277)**
0.172 (0.328)
  -0.904 (0.429)**








   25.133 (17.673)








   -0.705 (0.602)
  -2.186 (0.938)**
0.505 (3.083)
   -0.495 (0.695)
0.424 (0.317)
   -0.194 (0.370)
0.729 (0.757)
   -0.599 (0.440)
0.007 (0.004)
   0.824 (0.295)**
0.309 (0.353)




Table 3b.  The Strong Test of Rationality - Expected Retirement Age Conditional on last
period's - Restricted Sample
Variables Pooled OLS IV Corrected IV
Weak Test (H0: exp t =1):
Constant
Expected Retirement Age time  t
Test of Overid. Restrictions
Strong Test (H0: exp t =1):
Constant
Expected Retirement Age time t
Economic Factors time t
  Net Worth
  Respondent Earnings
  Private Health Insurance
Health Factors time t
   Health limitation
   Self Rating G, F, P
   Doctor visit times
   High blood pressure
   Diabetes problems
   Cancer
   Stroke
   Heart Problems
   Arthritis problems
   Difficulty walking
   Difficulty climbing stairs
Demographic time t
   Age
   Age squared
   Male
   Ba
   Profd
   Married
   Education
Adjusted R_squared
Lambda






   0.488 (0.034)**
    -0.009 (0.015)
0.0005 (0.0006)




    -0.086 (0.106)
  -0.451 (0.183)**
  -0.707 (0.272)**
0.083 (0.547)
    -0.031 (0.184)
    -0.099 (0.105)
0.057 (0.282)
0.687 (0.219)
    -0.172 (0.303)
0.004 (0.003)
0.134 (0.098)
    -0.008 (0.125)
    -0.246 (0.156)
    -0.005 (0.118)
0.527
Cannot Reject










    -0.055 (0.052)
0.002 (0.009)
0.033 (0.114)
    -0.240 (0.206)
 -0.527 (0.292)*
    -0.231 (0.263)
0.232 (0.263)
    -0.114 (0.186)
    -0.071 (0.203)
    -0.082 (0.291)
  -0.419 (0.143)**
   0.007 (0.003)**
0.233 (0.263)
0.061 (0.126)
    -0.205 (0.153)














   -0.197 (0.120)
0.015 (0.014)
   -0.180 (0.212)
   -0.719 (0.421)




   -0.240 (0.440)
0.740 (0.704)
   -0.362 (0.291)
0.001 (0.003)
   -0.079 (0.242)
   -0.271 (0.291)
   -0.357 (0.354)
0.357 (0.354)
Reject Null36
Table 4a .  The affect of new information on changes to plans for retirement
Full Sample,
  i.  No Selection Correction
coefficient (standard error)
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Economic Factors
  Changes in Net Worth
  Changes in Respondent Earnings
  Changes in Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
   Health limitation transitions
21
   Self Rating G, F, P transitions
22
   Stroke transitions
23
   Heart Problems transitions
3
   Cancer transitions
3
   Diabetes transitions
   High blood pressure transitions
3
   Arthritis transitions
   Smoking transitions
    Probability of living to age 85
   Doctor's visits
   Climbing stairs









  0.00004 (0.00085)
    -0.178 (0.434)
    -0.171 (0.487)
0.068 (0.239)
    -4.238 (2.956)
0.645 (0.863)
    2.195 (1.045)**
0.672 (0.591)
0.407 (0.355)
    -0.331 (0.342)
0.963 (1.187)
    1.557 (0.695)**
    -0.030 (0.026)
    -0.402 (0.947)
0.358 (0.816)
    -1.118 (2.338)
0.010
0.044 (0.187)
   0.0005 (0.0047)
1.330 (1.484)





   -0.853 (3.690)
   -0.013 (1.393)
   -1.743 (1.401)
   -0.070 (3.951)
    5.457 (2.632)**
0.191 (0.177)
   -5.179 (3.966)
5.712 (3.680)




                                                
21 =1 if new limitation, 0 if no change, and -1 if you got better
22 positive means health worsened (=1 if excellent, =5 if poor)
23  positive means condition (Stroke, cancer, hbp) worsened (0 no change, -1 if better)
24 =1 means new marriage, = 0 no change, =-1 dissolved marriage (widow, divorce…)37
Table 4a .  The affect of new information on changes to plans for retirement
Full Sample,
  ii.  Selection Correction
     coefficient (standard error)
Variables Pooled OLS Random Effects
Economic Factors
  Changes in Net Worth
  Changes in Respondent Earnings
  Changes in Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
   Health limitation transitions
25
   Self Rating G, F, P transitions
26
   Stroke transitions
27
   Heart Problems transitions
3
   Cancer transitions
3
   Diabetes transitions
   High blood pressure transitions
3
   Arthritis transitions
   Smoking transitions
    Probability of living to age 85
   Doctor's visits
   Climbing stairs







  -0.0003 (0.0020)
    -0.181 (0.435)
    -0.166 (0.472)
0.052 (0.230)
    -4.220 (3.024)
0.854 (0.816)
    2.350 (1.012)**
0.839 (0.697)
0.622 (0.417)
    -0.125 (0.394)
0.909 (0.948)
    1.629 (0.671)**
    -0.033 (0.029)
    -0.399 (0.860)
0.456 (0.746)
    -1.214 (1.909)
    -0.693 (0.752)
0.033 (0.045)
 -0.0001 (0.0019)
   -0.183 (0.437)
   -0.193 (0.475)
0.056 (0.230)
   -4.204 (3.037)
0.712 (0.792)
    2.212 (1.002)**
0.735 (0.681)
0.446 (0.351)
   -0.291 (0.329)
0.943 (0.950)
   1.569 (0.669)**
   -0.030 (0.029)
   -0.397 (0.864)
0.377 (0.742)
   -1.149 (1.914)
   -0.626 (0.841)
                                                
25 =1 if new limitation, 0 if no change, and -1 if you got better
26 positive means health worsened (=1 if excellent, =5 if poor)
27  positive means condition (Stroke, cancer, hbp) worsened (0 no change, -1 if better)
28 =1 means new marriage, = 0 no change, =-1 dissolved marriage (widow, divorce…)38
Table 4b .  The affect of new information on changes to plans for retirement
Restricted Sample,
i. No Selection Correction
coefficient (standard error)
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Economic Factors
  Changes in Net Worth
  Changes in Respondent Earnings
  Changes in Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
   Health limitation transitions
29
   Self Rating G, F, P transitions
30
   Stroke transitions
31
   Heart Problems transitions
3
   Cancer transitions
3
   Diabetes transitions
   High blood pressure transitions
3
   Arthritis transitions
   Smoking transitions
    Probability of living to age 85
   Doctor's visits
   Climbing stairs









   -0.0001 (0.0006)
  -0.422 (0.187)**
     -0.069 (0.197)
   0.188 (0.082)**
     -1.442 (0.555)**
     -0.235 (0.245)
0.161 (0.315)
  0.376 (0.202)*
0.007 (0.118)
0.049 (0.115)
     -0.228 (0.371)
0.208 (0.249)
     -0.013 (0.016)
     -0.332 (0.298)
0.076 (0.263)
     -0.755 (0.514)
0.013
0.074 (0.053)
     -0.001 (0.001)
     -0.547 (0.487)
     -0.503 (0.656)
0.037 (0.350)
-
     -0.367 (1.979)
     -0.229 (1.191)
0.372 (1.139)
0.161 (0.474)
     -0.547 (0.487)
0.782 (1.238)
     -0.393 (0.933)
0.075 (0.057)
   -2.962 (1.167)**
1.889 (1.278)




                                                
29 =1 if new limitation, 0 if no change, and -1 if you got better
30 positive means health worsened (=1 if excellent, =5 if poor)
31  positive means condition (Stroke, cancer, hbp) worsened (0 no change, -1 if better)
32 =1 means new marriage, = 0 no change, =-1 dissolved marriage (widow, divorce…)39
Table 4b .  The affect of new information on changes to plans for retirement
Restricted Sample,
iii.  Selection Correction
coefficient (standard error)
Variables Pooled OLS Random Effects
Economic Factors
  Changes in Net Worth
  Changes in Respondent Earnings
  Changes in Private Health Insurance
Health Factors
   Health limitation transitions
33
   Self Rating G, F, P transitions
34
   Stroke transitions
35
   Heart Problems transitions
3
   Cancer transitions
3
   Diabetes transitions
   High blood pressure transitions
3
   Arthritis transitions
   Smoking transitions
    Probability of living to age 85
   Doctor's visits
   Climbing stairs








     -0.411 (0.162)**
     -0.074 (0.180)
   0.222 (0.087)**
     -1.433 (1.119)
     -0.504 (0.313)
     -0.019 (0.377)
0.134 (0.260)
     -0.323 (0.163)**
     -0.259 (0.153)*
     -0.121 (0.368)
0.098 (0.253)
     -0.008 (0.011)
     -0.374 (0.328)
     -0.049 (0.283)
     -0.726 (0.756)
    1.054 (0.311)**
0.004 (0.018)
0.0001 (0.0007)
  -0.407 (0.163)**
   -0.013 (0.179)
   0.208 (0.086)**
   -1.447 (1.185)
   -0.357 (0.301)
0.174 (0.367)
0.278 (0.248)
   -0.060 (0.131)
   -0.025 (0.123)
   -0.164 (0.364)
0.188 (0.249)
   -0.013 (0.011)
   -0.364 (0.326)
0.082 (0.278)
   -0.790 (0.748)
0.020
   0.964 (0.278)**
                                                
33 =1 if new limitation, 0 if no change, and -1 if you got better
34 positive means health worsened (=1 if excellent, =5 if poor)
35  positive means condition (Stroke, cancer, hbp) worsened (0 no change, -1 if better)
36 =1 means new marriage, = 0 no change, =-1 dissolved marriage (widow, divorce…)40







   Net wealth
   Income
   Financially knowledgeable
Health Factors
   Limitations
   Self-ratings
   Doctor's visits
   Probability of living to 85
   Walking one mile
   Climbing stairs
   High blood pressure
   Diabetes
   Cancer
   Stroke
   Heart problems
   Arthritis
   Smoker
   Psych problems
   Back problems
Demographic
   Age
   Age squared
   Male
   BA
   Professional degree
   Married
   -0.007 (0.002)**
      0.005 (0.0002)**
  0.037 (0.020)*
   -0.188 (0.025)**
   -0.021 (0.010)**
   -0.012 (0.001)**
     -0.041 (0.029)
  -0.188 (0.035)**
     -0.023 (0.042)
  -0.056 (0.021)**
     -0.019 (0.036)
0.042 (0.056)
-0.238 (0.127)*
   0.187 (0.046)**
   0.560 (0.020)**
  -0.084 (0.021)**
  -0.161 (0.036)**
   0.235 (0.021)**
   0.280 (0.019)**
   -0.003 (0.0002)**
   0.300 (0.020)**
   0.055 (0.025)**
   0.095 (0.036)**
     -0.024 (0.024)
   -0.014 (0.002)**
      0.007 (0.0003)**
  0.043 (0.026)*
   -0.273 (0.027)**
   -0.050 (0.012)**
   -0.007 (0.001)**
     -0.021 (0.033)
   -0.156 (0.038)**
     -0.050 (0.045)
    0.056 (0.023)**
     -0.008 (0.040)
0.019 (0.061)
   -0.263 (0.129)**
  0.092 (0.050)*
    0.087 (0.022)**
   -0.063 (0.027)**
   -0.076 (0.038)**
    0.108 (0.024)**
    0.340 (0.023)**
    -0.003 (0.0002)**
    0.331 (0.026)**
    0.120 (0.032)**
    0.142 (0.048)**
     -0.020 (0.031)41







   Net wealth
   Income
   Financially knowledgeable
Health Factors
   Limitations
   Self-ratings
   Doctor's visits
   Probability of living to 85
   Walking one mile
   Climbing stairs
   High blood pressure
   Diabetes
   Cancer
   Stroke
   Heart problems
   Arthritis
   Smoker
   Psych problems
   Back problems
Demographic
   Age
   Age squared
   Male
   BA
   Professional degree
   Married
 0.0004 (0.0014)
      0.001 (0.0003)**
  0.060 (0.035)*
       -0.054 (0.041)
  0.034 (0.019)*
    0.009 (0.002)**
-0.105 (0.055)*
  -0.176 (0.056)**
0.006 (0.065)
  -0.440 (0.032)**
  -0.324 (0.062)**
  -0.400 (0.098)**
       -0.191 (0.219)
   -0.376 (0.077)**
   -0.442 (0.031)**
0.061 (0.073)
 -0.118 (0.061)*
    0.129 (0.035)**
   0.435 (0.044)**
   -0.004 (0.0004)**
   0.485 (0.035)**
   0.170 (0.044)**
   0.231 (0.064)**
       -0.005 (0.171)
   -0.0008 (0.0018)
    0.0009 (0.0004)**
    0.109 (0.046)**
0.023 (0.037)
    0.041 (0.017)**
    0.004 (0.002)**
0.008 (0.050)
     -0.027 (0.049)
     -0.019 (0.057)
  -0.136 (0.029)**
  -0.170 (0.055)**
  -0.170 (0.086)**
     -0.240 (0.185)
     -0.121 (0.074)
  -0.167 (0.028)**
0.011 (0.064)
     -0.023 (0.057)
   0.090 (0.032)**
   0.527 (0.046)**
   -0.005 (0.0004)**
   0.681 (0.047)**
   0.259 (0.061)**
   0.333 (0.096)**
     -0.160 (0.189)Appendix: The Dynamic Model
Here we provide a brief description of the dynamic model we analyze, and we also provide some sim-
ulations of a preliminary version of the model that reﬂect the ability that this type of framework has to
capture the types of features that we believe are desirable in a model of retirement behavior. Our objective
is to extend the traditional life cycle model to adequately account for Social Security, private pensions, and
various sources of uncertainty. In order to successfully introduce these changes we build upon the work of
Heckman (1974), who endogenizes the labor supply decision in the traditional life cycle model. He shows
that by extending the traditional life cycle model in this realistic fashion it is possible to reconcile the empir-
ical evidence on the patterns of consumption and income with the theory. He ﬁnds that it is not necessary to
resort to borrowing constraints, or income uncertainty (as Thurow 1969, and Nagatani 1972 have argued) in
order to explain why consumption tracks income over the life cycle, once labor supply is endogenous. How-
ever, his model does not allow for non-participation or uncertainty. Recent work by Low (1998, and 1999),
French (2000), Ben´ ıtez-Silva (2000), and Rust, Buchinsky, and Ben´ ıtez-Silva (2001), have contributed to
this literature showing that the more complete models are solvable, and excellent tools for policy analysis.
In this extended model utility is a function of consumption (c) and leisure (l), and agents optimally
choose both (and indirectly also savings since they are deﬁned as wealth minus consumption in a given
























































￿ is a bequest factor.1 b is a classic discount factor, and tt represents age-speciﬁc survival
probabilities, which in the empirical model can be, for older individuals, estimated using for example the
HRS and AHEAD data, or directly taken from the U.S. Life Tables. Savings, wt, accumulate at an uncertain
rate of return ˜ r, which for the moment we characterize as i
￿ i
￿ d
















where w represents wages. The within period utility function is assumed to be Isoelastic and Cobb-Douglas
1 Agents in this model care only about the absolute size of their bequests, which is why it has been called the “egoistic” model
of bequests. A bequest factor of one would correspond to valuing bequest in the utility function as much as current consumption.
The importance of bequest motives is still an open issue in the literature. Here we take the position of acknowledging that bequests
do exist, and we can explore the implications of changing the importance of the bequest motive in the utility function. Hurd (1987,
1989), Bernheim (1991), Modigliani (1988), Wilhem (1996) and Laitner and Juster (1996) are some of the main references on the
debate over the signiﬁcance of bequests and altruism in the life cycle model.






















where g is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion and h is the valuation of consumption versus leisure.2
Consumption and leisure are substitutes or complements depending on the value of g as discussed in Heck-
man (1974) and Low (1998). Below we will assume they are substitutes. For the moment we assume that
labor is discrete, agents can choose to work full-time, part-time, or not at all. h is health and takes the value
0 (good health), 1 (poor health), and 2 (disabled). We then add wage uncertainty to this model. We introduce















￿ draws from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance s2





We use dynamic programming to characterize this problem, and solve it by backward induction. The







































where labor is again chosen among the three possible states. Once we obtain the decision rules numerically





























































































The interpolation of the values of the next period value function has to be carried out in two dimensions, a
slightly cumbersome and slow procedure. The double integrals are solved by Gauss-Legendre quadrature,
and we use iterated integration since we are assuming independence of wages and interest rates.3
2 See Browning and Meghir (1991) for evidence on non-separability of consumption and leisure within periods.
3 Given that the value function depends on wealth and wages, we needed to discretize both variables in order to approximate the
integrals, using 50 points for wealth and 50 points for wages. We found that using fewer points signiﬁcantly affected the accuracy
of the calculations, leading to possible erroneous conclusions. See Rust (1996) and Judd (1998) for a discussion of the numerical
techniques used to solve this type of model.
2In Figures 1 to 3 we provide simulation results for an eighty period model. This is only a preliminary
set up of the model, and these simulations do not pretend to be realistic but illustrative of the capacity of
this model to replicate the qualitative patterns in the data. Figure 1 shows the average consumption path,
and also plots the average wages that full-time workers had access to. We can observe that this extended
model is able to capture the empirical regularity of consumption proﬁles tracking income, conﬁrming the
results of Heckman (1974) once non-participation and various sources of uncertainty are permitted. On
average, individuals work full-time most of their lives, something not very surprising given that we are not
modeling Social Security, pensions, or health uncertainties, in this preliminary model. Once we take those
into account we are likely to be able to replicate the labor supply patterns in the population. Finally, Figure
3 and 4, show the simulated and actual patterns of wealth accumulation over the life cycle, respectively. The
latter comes from Poterba (1998), who uses data from repeated cross-sections of the Survey of Consumer
Finances. Qualitatively, these patterns are strikingly similar, with most of the accumulation happening later
in life. This pattern has been very difﬁcult to replicate with any other type of life cycle model (See Hubbard
et al. 1994, and 1995). Once we are able to replicate actual patterns, we can simulate policy changes.
Health status has been shown to be one of the most important determinants not only of retirement
outcomes, but also of likely discrepancies between expectations and outcomes among the elderly, and we
have seen that in our results as well. Therefore, the incorporation of health in our model is one of our
main tasks to complete if this project is funded. There are many ways to incorporate health and we plan
to experiment with all of them. In the simplest speciﬁcation health can be proxied as an aging effect that
changes the valuation of consumption and leisure as work becomes more difﬁcult as the person ages. We
can also model it as a direct taste shifter. This effectively means to introduce it as a discrete stochastic
variable over which individuals form expectations of been either healthy or unhealthy. This is how we chose
to introduce it in the model above and in the simulations, shown in Figures 5 to 8. There we introduce in
the dynamic model the probability of moving from one state of health to another (good health, bad health,
disabled), and then compare the path of health states that the dynamic model predicts with the path we ﬁnd
in the HRS. As we can see the model replicates very well the empirical regularities. Notice, however, that is
important to take into account how survival probabilities affect the results. These results suggest our strategy
to incorporate health is quite successful and that the model predicts that individuals take into account the
uncertainty over their health states in order to update their decisions over the life cycle.
The most challenging project, however, is to introduce it as a continuous stochastic variable that ranges
fromcompletely healthy todisabled. Thiscanbecomputationally moredemanding and wearestill exploring
the feasibility of this extension.
We consider these preliminary results of the model as very promising. This is the benchmark model
3on top of which we plan to adequately characterize the Social Security and private pensions incentives, and
where health uncertainty can be added. From analyzing the extended model we will be able to characterize
a set of testable behavioral implications, which we are analyzing using the rich data provided in the HRS.
And more importantly, we are beginning to better understand the role of uncertainty and expectations in a
more realistic model of retirement decisions.
4Figure 1: Simulated Consumption. Serially Correlated Wages
Figure 2: Simulated Labor Supply. Serially Correlated Wages
5Figure 3: Simulated Wealth. Serially Correlated Wages
Figure 4: Wealth Accumulation from the SCF
6Figure 5: Survival probabilities. Life Tables and Simulations.
Figure 6: Health States. HRS. All waves.
7Figure 7: Health States. Simulations.
Figure 8: Health States. Simulations.
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